A mostly overlooked article published in late June put forth an interesting proposition: that the U.S. war on drugs has already been won.

Writing in the Columbus Dispatch on June 30, Ohio State University historian John C. Burnham recounted a recent meeting of seven former U.S. drug czars at the University of Maryland, held to mark the 35th anniversary of the appointment of the first U.S. drug czar, Jerome H. Jaffee, who served in the Nixon administration from 1971 to 1973.

Attendees at the program included Jaffe, Robert L. Du Pont, Dr. Peter G. Bourne, Lee I. Dogoloff, Donald Ian Macdonald, Lee Brown, and retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey; William Bennett and current drug czar John Walters were among those absent.

"The seven former czars and former staff members held remarkably unanimous views, though they come from a variety of backgrounds and included Democrats and Republicans who worked for five very different presidents. And what they had to say was often surprising," wrote Burnham. "The main conclusion -- that we won the war on drugs -- was the biggest surprise, because advocates of illegal drugs have in recent years filled the media with rhetoric about 'the failed war on drugs.'

"The czars' straightforward conclusion may come as a shock," wrote Burnham, "but as they outlined what the war was about, what they had to say made a lot of sense."

Burnham wrote that the "War on Drugs" initially grew out of concern about heroin use among returning U.S. Vietnam War veterans, but a combination of methadone maintenance, education, and law enforcement has resulted in a decline in heroin use and overdose deaths over the past 35 years. "This was the great victory of the war on drugs," wrote Burnham. "A recent small uptick in illegal drug use is remarkably insignificant compared with the original problem."

Drug Czars Dispute Conclusions
As it turns out, Burnham's conclusions did come as a bit of a shock – to some of the drug czars who took part in the program. In interviews with Join Together, Jaffe, Dogoloff, and Brown each disputed the notion that the drug czars agreed that the drug war had succeeded. Dogoloff, who served as drug czar during the Carter administration, said he was "flabbergasted" at Burnham's characterization. Brown, who served as Bill Clinton's drug czar, said, "I do not recall anyone, especially me, reaching the conclusion that we have won the war on drugs."

"In the long scope of our country dealing with drug use – which has been going on for more than 100 years – the Vietnam issue was a small blip," added Jaffee. "I can't say we won a war; we addressed what was an acute problem at the time and got it to be a more manageable, chronic problem."

Jaffee said that Burnham came closer to the truth when he wrote that, "Everyone at the conference knew that the problem is going to continue for American society, but at a much lower level than 35 years before. That is what laws do: They attempt to control problems, not bring perfection. Laws against murder provide hope to control the problem, not abolish murder."

Burnham's other major conclusion from observing the event -- that even drug "czars" with little formalized power can make a difference through leadership -- won more acceptance. Dogoloff, for example, pointed to success in using policies like drug testing to prevent returning Vietnam veterans from continuing to use heroin. "You can change behavior and culture," he said. "The fun part and the challenging part was learning how we could do that."

Finding Consensus on Treatment
Maia Szalavitz, a senior fellow at the media watchdog STATS who has written extensively about drug policy, took issue with both Burnham's article and the recent 2006 U.N. World Drug Report, which concluded that the world's drug problems "have been contained."

"There's a curious new trend amongst drug warriors these days -- declaring victory," wrote Szalavitz. "Nixon spent $16 million per year on his drug war; Bush now spends more than $18 billion, and this is victory?" she wrote. "Our prison population has more than doubled, a majority of teens still try drugs before they finish high school, and a 5 percent drop in use is a victory?"

Szalavitz conceded that drug use is down from its peak in 1979-80, but added, "If you're going to declare victory, shouldn't drug trends show some relationship to your efforts? Drug-war spending has increased every single year -- but drug use trends have waxed and waned with little connection to this."

"If drug warriors want to declare victory and go home ... I'm all for it," she wrote. "But claim that you've won and maintain the same policy that spends billions and locks up millions and has virtually no effect on either drug use rates, drug-related harm or addiction rates? What have you been smoking?"

Oddly, the one area of agreement that Burnham overlooks in his article is where the views of reformers like Szalavitz and drug czars like Dogoloff – a self-described "right-wing Democrat" who serves on the board of the conservative Drug Watch International – tend to dovetail: the need for more addiction treatment.

"Everyone has agreed for the past 20 or 30 years that the only real improvements will come from demand reduction, not supply reduction," said Dogoloff, who concluded his presentation at the drug-czar anniversary event by saying, "Despite repeated demonstrations that comprehensive treatment-on-demand programs reduce the demand for drugs, we fail to translate that learning into the federal drug-strategy budget. 

"Given what we now know about the co-occurrence of mental illness and substance abuse, the negative economic and social impact of these disorders on our citizens, and the cost-benefit of treatment, isn't it time to make drug abuse and mental health treatment available to all who seek it?" said Dogoloff. "It seems to me that when we accept this truth, our demand for drugs will decrease and the federal drug strategy will have a greater likelihood of achieving success."

COMMENTARY
No neutral observer could argue that some of the key goals of the drug war have been approached, if not exactly met. Adolescent use of illicit drugs has declined over the past 20 years, while use of heroin has remained stable, if stubbornly so. On the other hand, America's addiction problem is a constantly moving target, and one that increasingly is falling outside the parameters of the traditional drug war.

With national drug-control policy focused on marijuana, cocaine and heroin, prescription-drug abuse has slipped through the back door and -- as the product of a legal industry like alcohol and tobacco -- may prove to be more difficult to control than its illegitimate cousins.

And, of course, alcohol remains the most popular drug of choice among adolescents and adults -- a fact that no drug czar or national drug-control strategy has adequately addressed, thanks to pressure from the alcohol industry. Undoubtedly, the equally powerful pharmaceutical companies are already working to ensure that policies to prevent abuse of prescription drugs are similarly attenuated to reflect their interests.

Critics like Szalavitz are correct to question the cost of "victory" in the drug war, both in monetary terms and in erosion of civil liberties and increased incarceration.

But perhaps the bigger question is how long the nation will continue to wage this costly battle.

Burnham finds proof of the success of the drug war in public-opinion polls: "Thirty-five years ago, illegal drugs were usually first or second and no lower than fourth as public concerns," he noted. "Now the drugs issue trails many other problems."

Others might argue that this is less a sign of progress than combat fatigue. Already, the addiction treatment and prevention fields are seeing federal spending eroded, and the Bush administration has elicited howls of protest from lawmakers and constituency groups for cutting back on funding for local anti-drug law enforcement.

One suspects that the latter group will continue to have more luck arguing their case than the former, despite the consensus about the primacy of demand reduction. As Dogoloff says, "You can't see treatment; you can see powder on the table."

Many of the looming cutbacks in the anti-drug budget are directly attributable to the "War on Terror," which shares with the drug war the promise of open-ended commitment, fuzzy parameters for victory, and a disturbing focus on an abstraction rather than an "enemy."

The budget scenario at home and experiences abroad -- I'm thinking specifically of the poppy fields of Afghanistan, where U.S. drug policy has become a critical impediment to establishing stability and defeating the Taliban -- suggest that the U.S. is incapable of fighting successfully on both fronts.

So perhaps the issue is not if we've had a "Mission Accomplished" moment in the drug war, but rather if the 35 years of tangible progress touted by the drug czars in Maryland will be sustained in the face of diminished funding and attention.

READERS RESPOND: War on Drugs 
We received an unprecedented number of passionate, thoughtful responses to this feature story. We published a representative sampling in a three-part series.

Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3